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ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc on several of the
nation’s industries, aviation being no stranger given the financial difficulties, flight cancellations, and health mandates the
sector consequently faced. Despite concerns that a wave of bankruptcy filings would submerge U.S. bankruptcy courts, the domestic need for restructuring did not arise as predicted, the
main reason being the federal assistance provided to enterprises
in peril. On the contrary, foreign debtor airlines were the ones
to avail themselves of the experience and efficiency of magnet
districts for restructuring under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Simultaneously, large domestic corporations sought the
assistance of New York and Delaware to restructure quite far
from their home districts. This phenomenon, known as forum
shopping, revived a spirit of congressional reform; proponents
sought to condemn forum shopping as undermining the fairness and integrity of the bankruptcy system overall. Thus, Congress introduced a bill to reform bankruptcy venue and
ultimately put an end to forum shopping.
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This Comment critically analyzes the arguments by proponents of reform—arguing in favor of a “race to the bottom” theory that condemns the practice of forum shopping—as
compared with arguments by opponents of reform—perceiving
the current status quo and bankruptcy venue as racing debtors
to the top by having magnet districts offer expertise, efficiency,
and predictability to entities in need of restructuring. In siding
with “race to the top” theorists, this Comment further explains
the danger reforming bankruptcy venue could have in undermining the United States’ position as the golden standard in
Chapter 11 restructuring, forcing foreign debtor airlines to avail
themselves of courts in the United Kingdom (U.K.) or Singapore that are progressively becoming restructuring hotspots.
Proposed alternatives to bankruptcy venue reform include remedies limiting forum shopping to protect the United States’ reputation in restructuring and preserve the rights of U.S.
creditors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T WOULD SEEM ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE not to discuss the
COVID-19 pandemic because it has drastically altered the
course of people’s lives. In addition to the pandemic’s human
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impact, the financial uncertainties that emerged from the pandemic have wreaked havoc on several of the world’s industries,
one being aviation. Some statistics released by the International
Air Transport Association (IATA) reveal the devastating effects
the pandemic has had on global air transport, the decline in air
passengers for the year 2020 being the largest ever recorded
since the 1950s.1 Aviation experts generally agree that a full recovery ought not to be expected until 2024.2 With anticipated
financial distress comes bankruptcy. Many experts predicted “a
tidal wave”3 of filings and called on Congress to increase the
capacity of bankruptcy courts to handle a flood of bankruptcy
filings.4
Surprisingly, many of the filings that made their way to the
United States were not from domestic companies but rather foreign entities availing themselves of the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.5 This noted decrease in domestic filings6 and absence of
U.S. airlines seeking restructuring assistance can be partially explained by the financial assistance of the federal government
from the CARES Act, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
1 Airline Industry Statistics Confirm 2020 Was Worst Year on Record, IATA (Aug. 3,
2021), https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2021-08-03-01 [https://
perma.cc/ZNR6-PQBR]. IATA recorded 1.8 billion passengers flying in 2020, “a
decrease of 60.2% compared to the 4.5 billion” passengers flying in 2019. Id.
Looking at the industry-wide demand for air travel, IATA recorded a drop by
65.9%, estimating total industry passenger revenues to have fallen by 69% with
total net losses of $126.4 billion. Id.
2 Madlyn Primoff & Alex Rich, Why Non-U.S. Air Carriers Avail Themselves of U.S.
Chapter 11 to Reorganize, FRESHFIELDS (Dec. 7, 2020), https://blog.freshfields.us/
post/102gllw/why-non-u-s-air-carriers-avail-themselves-of-u-s-chapter-11-to-reorganize [https://perma.cc/7NFS-WANZ].
3 Mary Williams Walsh, A Tidal Wave of Bankruptcies is Coming, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/business/corporate-bankruptcycoronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/VLP4-U6AK] (Aug. 3, 2020).
4 David Skeel, The Populist Backlash in Chapter 11, BROOKINGS (Jan. 12, 2022),
(citing Letter from Jared A. Ellias, Chair, Large Corps. Comm. of the Bankr. &
COVID-19 Working Grp., to Sens. McConnell & Schumer, and Reps. Pelosi &
McCarthy (June 10, 2020)), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-populistbacklash-in-chapter-11 [https://perma.cc/46SW-WBEQ]).
5 Richard J. Cooper & John H. Veraja, Chapter 11: An Increasingly Popular Tool
for Foreign Companies Seeking to Restructure or Liquidate, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Oct.
2021), https://www.financierworldwide.com/chapter-11-an-increasingly-populartool-for-foreign-companies-seeking-to-restructure-or-liquidate#.YeSUnC-B0Ut
[https://perma.cc/U7U3-HQYY] (referencing a study published by the Bankruptcy Research Database of the UCLA School of Law demonstrating that the
number of large foreign corporations filing for bankruptcy has more than
doubled from the previous high).
6 See Skeel, supra note 4.
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2021, and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, all providing
billions of dollars to passenger and cargo air carriers.7 On the
contrary, foreign airlines—especially airlines from Latin
America—avidly sought the help of U.S. courts given the limited, if not nonexistent, assistance provided to them by their respective governments.8 During the course of the pandemic, four
airlines have filed in the Southern District of New York to
restructure and resume flying operations: Avianca9 (having first
restructured in 2003),10 LATAM,11 Aeroméxico,12 and Philippine Airlines.13
Whether coincidental, the increased number of foreign airlines filing for bankruptcy in New York came at an opportune
time.14 In fact, the bankruptcy filings by large U.S. corporations
far away from their “home districts,” including Purdue Pharma
and several Catholic dioceses, has revived the debate of re7 See Airline and National Security Relief Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-american-industry/airline-and-national-security-relief-programs [https://perma.cc/K92X2DA7].
8 See Oliver Clark, Latin American Carriers Put Faith in Chapter 11, AIRFIN. J.,
https://www.airfinancejournal.com/articles/3580392/latin-american-carriersput-faith-in-chapter-11 [https://perma.cc/YP5F-E2U5] (Sept. 1, 2020, 3:39 PM)
(by late May 2020, Latin American governments supported the airline industry
with $300 million, amounting to only 0.8% of the airlines’ 2019 revenues).
9 In re Avianca Holdings S.A., 618 B.R. 684, 688 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020).
10 In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colom. S.A. Avianca, 303 B.R. 1, 1–2 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter In re Avianca].
11 In re LATAM Airlines Grp. S.A., 620 B.R. 722, 731 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020).
12 Anthony Harrup, Aeroméxico Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection, WALL ST.
J. https://www.wsj.com/articles/aeromexico-files-for-debt-restructuring-underchapter-11-11593560968 [https://perma.cc/FR59-7S7M] (June 30, 2020, 9:53
PM).
13 Philippine Airlines Files for Chapter 11 in U.S. After COVID-19 Crisis, REUTERS
(Sept. 3, 2021, 8:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/philippine-airlinesbankruptcy/philippine-airlines-files-for-chapter-11-in-u-s-after-covid-19-crisisidUSL1N2Q600A [https://perma.cc/L9T7-2Q9U]. Philippine Airlines was the
only airline to have restructured successfully within four months despite an outstanding indebtedness of over $2 billion. Jonathan Burgos, Billionaire Lucio Tan’s
Philippine Airlines Exits Bankruptcy, Poised to Recover from Pandemic Losses, FORBES
(Jan. 2, 2022, 9:40 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanburgos/2022/
01/02/billionaire-lucio-tans-philippine-airlines-exits-bankruptcy-poised-to-recover-from-pandemic-losses/?sh=3e0e6a924fd9 [https://perma.cc/Q3HB57Q3]. LATAM and Aeroméxico filed for extensions to present their restructuring plans, even though both airlines commenced bankruptcy proceedings over a
year ago. Daniel Martı́nez Garbuno, LATAM and Aeromexico File to Extend Chapter
11 Plan Deadline, SIMPLE FLYING (June 9, 2021), https://simpleflying.com/latamaeromexico-chapter-11-extension [https://perma.cc/AP8Y-U56C].
14 See Skeel, supra note 4.
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forming bankruptcy venue.15 Unbeknownst to most, this “populist” reform movement emerged in the 1990s and became a
renewed topic of discussion following those filings;16 proponents of reform accused forum shoppers of threatening the integrity and fairness of the bankruptcy system.17 However,
reforming bankruptcy venue as it stands today could bar foreign
entities and airlines from accessing U.S. courts altogether. But
why should that be of concern, especially when dealing with actors in aviation?
This Comment attempts to answer the aforementioned question. Part I provides an overview of the Bankruptcy Code and
specific provisions of Chapter 11 that have made it a global tool
of reference for restructuring. Part II offers a discussion of the
bipartisan Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act introduced in Congress in June 2021. It further evaluates the debate by scholars
and practitioners on the “race to the bottom” versus “race to the
top” dichotomy by rejecting the former approach. Lastly, Part
III analyzes how reform could develop a global phenomenon of
forum shopping, which would likely make foreign airlines reticent to avail themselves of U.S. courts. By arguing against reform, Part III attempts to demonstrate how the project to
reform bankruptcy venue would (a) undermine the United
States’ place as the global leader in aviation and (b) weaken the
protections U.S. laws afford U.S. creditors.
II.

THE TOURISM MAGNET AS THE RESTRUCTURING
REFERENCE

A.

HISTORY

BANKRUPTCY CODE AND MOST NOTABLE
PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 11

OF THE

The U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Code), specifically its Chapter 11
restructuring provisions,18 have been described as “one of the
strongest and most well developed business reorganization
schemes in the world.”19 When it first enacted the Code, ConId.
See id.
17 See Adam J. Levitin, Purdue’s Poison Pill: The Breakdown of Chapter 11’s Checks
and Balances, 100 TEX. L. REV. 101, 170 (2022) (discussing the manipulation of
venue by larger corporations filing for Chapter 11, undermining confidence in
the fairness of the bankruptcy system overall).
18 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1195.
19 MICHELLE M. HARNER, FINAL REPORT OF THE ABI COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, at 8 (2014) [hereinafter ABI Report] (citing Nathalie
Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Sys15
16
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gress intended to allow for the rescue and rehabilitation of “the
honest but unfortunate debtor,” which also included the business entity experiencing financial distress.20 This idea of bankruptcy provided a breathing spell—a fresh start to the debtor—
which has made the U.S. bankruptcy laws stand out worldwide.21
The original 1898 Bankruptcy Act became the subject of reform following the Great Depression, a time when keeping businesses in operation while “restructuring their obligations”
became paramount.22 One could argue that the COVID-19 pandemic has embodied similar concerns. After forty years without
reform to the Code, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States was officially established in 1970 to make some
changes that both Congress and practitioners alike felt were
necessary to meet the economic demands of the time.23 The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 emphasized the legislature’s
goal to encourage debtor rehabilitation.24 This “first comprehensive reform of federal bankruptcy law” since the 1930s focused on protecting both debtor and nondebtor interests and
was subsequently followed by multiple amendments.25 The last
significant amendment to the bankruptcy laws came with the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (BAPCPA), which was passed into law after practitioners
and commentators advocated for reform to address the apparent deficiencies in the law in light of the changing economic
environment and inequities among different creditor
constituencies.26
Presently, air carriers are seeking ways to bolster their liquidity, cure defaults on aircraft leases, and process ticket refunds—
all of which can be efficiently accomplished through a Chapter

tems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 1, 4
(2005)) .
20 Id. (citing Jason J. Kilborn, Bankruptcy Law, in GOVERNING AMERICA: MAJOR
DECISIONS OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM 1789 TO THE PRESENT 41–49 (Paul J. Quirk & William Cunion eds., 2011)).
21 Id. (citing Kilborn, supra note 20, at 41–49).
22 Id. at 9 (citing Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the
United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 22 (1995)).
23 Id. at 10.
24 See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L.
REV. 129, 131 (2005).
25 Id. at 142, 148.
26 See generally ABI Report, supra note 19, at 11.
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11 restructuring.27 Their principal goal is to stabilize their business through capital infusion, a “breathing spell” that Chapter
11 can grant.28 The restructuring remedy is often perceived as
debtor-friendly in part because of the debtor-in-possession
(DIP).29 The DIP, often a member of the company’s management, remains in control of the assets and runs the company in
its ordinary course of business while undergoing reorganization.30 Chapter 11 has remained the gold standard for business
restructuring over time—setting aside the pandemic and its impact on the aviation industry.31 For example, the Colombian airline Avianca first took advantage of U.S. courts in 2003 by using
Chapter 11 to restructure.32 The broad scope of what constitutes
“property” for eligibility purposes33 has permitted foreign companies to meet a de minimis threshold in getting a “passport” into
U.S. courts.34 Extensive case law from magnet districts—the
Southern District of New York and Delaware—supports that proposition by showing how permissive certain judges have been in

27 See, e.g., Timothy Graulich, Stephen Piraino & Matthew Masaro, International
Airlines and the Benefits of Chapter 11, 15 INSOLV. & RESTRUC. INT’L 22, 22, 24–25
(2021).
28 Id. at 24.
29 See Fredric Sosnick & Ronni Arnold, Restructuring & Insolvency in the USA,
LEXOLOGY (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
4cfbd481-874d-4f18-9a2a-4df7e08e352b [https://perma.cc/EPY6-EBGW]; 11
U.S.C. § 1101(1).
30 Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics [https://
perma.cc/6WRB-XKQ6].
31 See, e.g., Bojan Guzina & Andrew O’Neil, Chapter 11 Cases Soared in 2020, with
More Distress Likely in 2021, WHITE & CASE: DEBT EXPLORER (Feb. 19, 2021),
https://debtexplorer.whitecase.com/leveraged-finance-commentary/chapter-11cases-soared-in-2020-with-more-distress-likely-in-2021 [https://perma.cc/8TMW6N8N].
32 Judge Gropper’s discussion of the appropriateness of bankruptcy venue in
the Southern District of New York for the Colombian airline and his response to
creditors will be discussed in detail in Part II, infra.
33 11 U.S.C. § 109(d).
34 Shana Elberg, Using the Bankruptcy Code for International Restructuring, N.Y.
L.J. (June 13, 2016).
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finding in favor of the debtor’s eligibility under § 109(d),35
deeming “a dollar, a dime or a peppercorn” sufficient.36
Some of the Code’s provisions are worth revisiting because
they are mainly responsible for the United States’ status as the
tourism magnet for restructuring.37 In addition to a DIP overseeing the whole reorganization process, the global automatic
stay is one of the most attractive features of a Chapter 11 reorganization given that the far-reaching provision comes into effect immediately upon filing.38 By encompassing “all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property,”39 the provision’s
reach is immense and prevents any creditor from taking any action that could be detrimental to the filing entity absent court
approval.40 The automatic stay allows for the capture of both
tangible and intangible interests of the filing entity and claims
against it, regardless of a creditor’s location in the world.41 Some
practitioners note that the mere threat of filing for bankruptcy
in the United States and the resulting automatic stay have served
as powerful negotiating techniques to encourage out-of-court restructuring.42 While the automatic stay makes Chapter 11 an op35 See, e.g., In re Berau Cap. Res. PTE Ltd., 540 B.R. 80, 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2015) (holding indentures with a New York choice of law clause qualified as
property in the United States for purposes of filing eligibility); In re Octaviar Admin. Proprietary Ltd., 511 B.R. 361, 369–70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating
causes of action against domestic entities were generally recognized as property
of a foreign entity for filing eligibility in bankruptcy); In re Glob. Ocean Carriers
Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 39 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (ruling funds in a bank account,
irrespective of amount, and undrawn retainers satisfied eligibility requirements
for bankruptcy filing).
36 In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428, 431–32 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
$194 in a bank account was “clearly ‘property’” despite the foreign entity’s operations and assets being mainly located abroad, while noting a bad faith filing could
result in a dismissal of the case if property was put in the United States for eligibility purposes).
37 See Clark, supra note 8.
38 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 362.
39 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
40 See U.S. CTS., supra note 30.
41 See Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Bernard L.
Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 474 B.R. 76, 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (upholding extraterritorial enforcement of the automatic stay against a creditor’s lawsuit); Nakash
v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[B]ased upon
the applicable Code sections, [and] other indicia of congressional intent . . . the
automatic stay applies extraterritorially.”).
42 Shana A. Elberg, Lisa Laukitis & Liz Downing, International Companies Continue to Turn to U.S. Restructurings in 2021 for COVID-19 Relief, REUTERS (Dec. 23,
2021, 9:53 AM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/internationalcompanies-continue-turn-us-restructurings-2021-covid-19-relief-2021-12-23
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timal choice, one key consideration is whether U.S. court orders
will be enforceable against foreign creditors.43 This is often not
of concern because the overwhelming majority of airlines’ credit
lenders and bondholders have ties to the United States, making
them subject to U.S. jurisdiction and remedies for violating the
automatic stay.44
Another provision to consider is the plan permitting the
debtor to restructure over time. Under Chapter 11, voting for
plan approval requires two-thirds in claim amounts and at least
51% in numbers for each class of creditors;45 in contrast, many
foreign countries require a greater percentage of assenting creditors.46 While plan confirmation must meet certain statutory requirements, Chapter 11 uniquely provides debtors with a major
tool against recalcitrant creditors that, until very recently, was
only available in U.S. courts.47 The Code’s cramdown provision
permits courts to disregard creditors’ objections by deeming the
plan “fair and equitable, with respect to each class [of creditors] . . . [t]hat is impaired under, and has not accepted, the
plan.”48
In addition to letting a DIP run the reorganizational effort,
DIP financing49 adds to the appeal of Chapter 11.50 This provision allows a DIP to seek funds and secure capital deemed essential to a successful restructuring and exiting bankruptcy;51 both
LATAM and Aeroméxico used this feature of the Code.52 As an
[https://perma.cc/LM9A-LPHP] (noting the efficacy of protecting one’s interests by filing in a U.S. court).
43 See, e.g., In re Madoff, 474 B.R. at 82 (“[A] bankruptcy court can enforce the
automatic stay extraterritorially only against entities over which it has in personam
jurisdiction.”).
44 Cf. Elberg, Laukitis & Downing, supra note 42 (discussing how Chapter 11 is
a viable restructuring tool for foreign entities with U.S. creditors because those
creditors are bound by U.S. court orders).
45 11 U.S.C § 1126(c).
46 See, e.g., Wai Yee Wan, Casey Watters & Gerard McCormack, Schemes of Arrangement in Singapore: Empirical and Comparative Analyses, 94 AM. BANKR. L.J. 463,
470 (2020) (referencing the United Kingdom and Singapore as two countries
with a 75% in value of creditors voting on the plan).
47 The new insolvency law enacted in the United Kingdom under the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act of 2020 (CIGA) offers a similar cramdown
provision that will be further discussed in Part III, infra.
48 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
49 Id. § 364.
50 Clark, supra note 8.
51 Id.
52 Cooper & Veraja, supra note 5. Substantial DIP financing was secured by
LATAM ($2.45 billion), Avianca ($2 billion), and Aeroméxico ($1 billion). Id.
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example of how powerful DIP financing can be, Swissport International, a global cargo and aircraft ground handling company
operating in forty-seven countries with two hundred legal entities, added a provision to its lending agreement that would have
permitted Chapter 11 reorganization.53 Swissport used DIP financing as a negotiating tool; the leverage of having a possible
DIP loan with priming priority was sufficient to convince international creditors to settle—fearing the senior status of DIP financing against their debts in repayment priorities.54
While the ability to sell property “free and clear of any interest”55 and liens may be another appealing provision, the ability
to reject executory contracts (not yet fully performed) and
unexpired leases56 might come at the top of the list. Section
1110 is specifically relevant to airlines undergoing restructuring
since the debtor must agree to perform its obligations and cure
any defaults within sixty days of the petition date.57 Failing to do
so would allow the debtor airline to reject the lease and abandon the leased assets to the lender.58 This provision may indeed
prove invaluable to fleet rationalization in times of financial distress and drastically reduced airline travel. In addition, because
Section 365 further permits the rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs), it is a powerful tool even when dealing
with foreign workers’ unions.59
B.

VENUE, ONCE AGAIN

UP FOR

DEBATE

Unquestionably, the most controversial provision of the Bankruptcy Code pertaining to Chapter 11 is that of bankruptcy
venue, which allows a debtor to file in any district
53 David Turetsky, Will Guerrieri, Aaron Colodny, Livy Mezei & Kathryn Sutherland-Smith, Using the Chapter 11 Toolkit to Maximise Value in Cross-Border Restructurings, IFLR (Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.iflr.com/article/b1vczqskj8crvm/
using-the-chapter-11-toolkit-to-maximise-value-in-cross-border-restructurings
[https://perma.cc/J97W-4Q62].
54 Id.
55 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
56 Id. § 365(a).
57 Id. § 1110(a)(2). Avianca, LATAM, and Aeroméxico all rejected aircraft
leases. Graulich, Piraino & Masaro, supra note 27, at 24. LATAM specifically rejected nineteen aircraft leases along with some of its Japanese operating leases.
Clark, supra note 8.
58 11 U.S.C. § 1110.
59 See Marco Macca, Aeromexico Looks to Terminate ASPA/ASSA Collective Agreement, AIRWAYS MAG. (Jan. 14, 2021), https://airways.news/airlines/am-terminateaspa-assa-cba/ [https://perma.cc/VS2R-HZUU]. A debtor’s rejection of CBAs is
further subject to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113–14.
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(1) in which the domicile, residence, principal place of business . . . or principal assets in the United States, of the person or
entity . . . [has] been located for the one hundred and eighty
days immediately preceding such commencement . . . or
(2) in which there is pending a case . . . concerning such person’s affiliate, general partner, or partnership.60

While this provision leaves the debtor with a wide array of potential districts to choose from, a change of venue may be
prompted “in the interest of justice or for the convenience of
the parties.”61 This venue issue, revived by the COVID-19 pandemic, unleashed a “populist backlash” similar to the reaction to
the 2008 financial crisis.62 Proponents of venue reform denounced bailouts of large financial institutions and corporations
that filed for Chapter 11 in venues far from their home districts.63 Reform proponents claimed that these filings ultimately
jeopardized the interests of local parties by allowing forum shopping for favorable precedent.64 In this regard, the infamous
magnet districts of Delaware and the Southern District of New
York65 have long been criticized for undermining the fairness of
the bankruptcy system. Through this practice, not only are debtors picking a specific venue but also the judge that will hear
their case.66 One critic of the current system, Professor Lynn
LoPucki,67 went as far as implying that judges in those districts
essentially lured companies, ultimately enticing forum shopping
and depriving local venues of the opportunity to hear the case
where financial distress might be felt the most.68 LoPucki’s fervent accusations against New York and Delaware were repri28 U.S.C. § 1408(1)–(2) (emphasis added).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a)(1)–(2).
62 See Skeel, supra note 4.
63 Id.
64 See id. (referencing the controversial filings by Purdue Pharma and several
Catholic dioceses); Levitin, supra note 17, at 150.
65 Jane VanLare & Hugh K. Murtagh, Chapter 11 Venue–Defending (or Upending)
the Debtor’s Choice, 12 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 25, 26–27 n.7 (2016) (suggesting that a
majority of large Chapter 11 filings over the past thirty years have been in Delaware and the Southern District of New York); see Trend Tracking, UCLA-LOPUCKI
BANKR. RSCH. DATABASE, https://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/trend_tracking.php
[https://perma.cc/988N-7VDE].
66 See Levitin, supra note 17, at 150. Certain districts such as White Plains, New
York, only have one sitting bankruptcy judge. Id. at 153.
67 LoPucki is known to be an avid advocate of universalism and bankruptcy
venue reform. See generally LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 123–25 (2005).
68 Id. at 124–25.
60
61
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manded as an “offensive fantasy” by some.69 Similar to LoPucki,
Judge Rhodes, who oversaw the restructuring of the City of Detroit, described the venue selection process as “the single most
significant source of injustice in Chapter 11” and denounced
the threat it posed to the integrity of the bankruptcy system
given how the alleged “bankruptcy system . . . appear[ed] so
easily manipulated.”70
One example discussing the venue issue and whether venue
would have been proper outside of New York is In re Avianca.71
Contrary to some of the positions explored above is Judge Gropper’s take when presiding over the first Avianca filing. Though
quite unpopular at the time it was released, his opinion discussed some of the key concerns of proponents of bankruptcy
venue reform, concerns that are still present today.72 Judge
Gropper took a bold position in upholding a debtor’s venue selection when he found venue in the Southern District of New
York as proper for a foreign airline incorporated in Colombia
despite having most of its assets, employees, and creditors located abroad.73 Noting that insolvency laws in Colombia were
relatively new and untested,74 the judge concluded that an
American venue would be proper considering the airline’s fleet,
its largest creditors and lessors, were all “located or doing business in the United States.”75 In response to a motion to remove
the case to a Colombian venue that many saw as more proper,
Judge Gropper explained that cases where such transfer had
been allowed were due to an already-existing foreign proceed69 Anthony J. Casey & Joshua C. Macey, Bankruptcy Shopping: Domestic Venue
Races and Global Forum Wars, 37 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 463, 466 (2021) (quoting
Jonathan Randles, Companies Lease Offices in New York Suburb to Pick Bankruptcy
Judge, WALL ST. J. (August 13, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
companies-lease-offices-in-new-york-suburb-to-pick-bankruptcy-judge11597311001 [https://perma.cc/7WRZ-9HCP]).
70 Peter Califano, Subsidiarity at Work – In Bankruptcy Venue Reform?, 32 COM. L.
WORLD 11, 11 (2018).
71 In re Avianca, 303 B.R. 1, 3–4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
72 Id. at 8–14.
73 Id. at 3–4, 11.
74 Id. at 10 (noting filing by a parent company headquartered in Colombia
rested on its U.S. subsidiary, Avianca, Inc., for proceedings in an American
forum).
75 Id. at 3. One of Avianca’s American creditors was the Bank of New York, the
issuer of notes held by the airline’s creditors, whose agreement was governed by
New York law. Id. at 10. As previously discussed, the ability of an American bankruptcy court’s judgment to bind foreign creditors, lessors, and financial institutions is central to choosing the United States as a restructuring venue. See Elberg,
Laukitis & Downing, supra note 42.
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ing entitling them to recognition under § 305(a)(2).76 In such
case, filing in the United States would solely be to access certain
laws and remedies not available in the foreign home jurisdiction, which would ultimately render U.S. venue improper.77
Lastly, Judge Gropper highlighted another key facet of the
properness of U.S. venue: the level of contacts the Colombian
airline had with American creditors.78 He stated that the airline’s real assets were its contractual rights such as the aircraft
leases, right to use airport facilities, and agreements with travel
agents.79 In his view, the leased aircraft were the most important
assets to the airline.80 Due to their mobility, control over the
lessors could amount to “the equivalent of control over the assets [themselves].”81 Considering that Colombian law did not offer an effective mechanism for rejecting leases the way § 1110
might and that Avianca’s main creditors were in fact aircraft lessors, Judge Gropper rejected the creditors’ motion for change
of venue and deemed venue proper in New York.82
This 2003 case touches on certain points of controversy that
prompted reform to bankruptcy venue, begging the question of
why forum shopping should be tolerated especially in favor of
foreign entities with mostly foreign creditors and overseas business. While critics and proponents of reform both raise valid
points, a closer look at venue and the “race to the bottom” versus “race to the top” dichotomy undeniably reveals why forum
shopping is desirable in bankruptcy, more so than in other areas
of the law.
III.

BANKRUPTCY VENUE REFORM OF 2021
A.

REVIVING

THE

SPIRIT

OF

REFORM

The revived call to reform bankruptcy venue came as a bipartisan bill first introduced in the Senate by Senator Elizabeth
Warren (D-Mass.) and Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex.), both of
whom wished to tighten venue rules for corporate debtors.83
In re Avianca, 303 B.R. at 9.
See id. at 9–10.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 12.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 13.
83 Stephen Selbst & Rachel Ginzburg, What the Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of
2021 Could Mean for Corporate Debtors, HERRICK RESTRUC. REV. (Oct. 25, 2021),
https://www.herrickrestructuringreview.com/2021/10/what-the-bankruptcy76
77
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The key highlights of the proposed reform include eliminating
forum shopping by limiting a bankruptcy filing to the debtor’s
principal place of business or location of principal assets 180
days prior to filing.84 Interestingly, this bipartisan effort to reform venue is not the first of its kind. While Congress successfully achieved the goal of eliminating the state of incorporation
as an appropriate venue, the reform was abandoned from 1973
to 1978.85 Congress ultimately restored the state of incorporation with the 1978 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.86 More
recently, the Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011 had similar
bipartisan support,87 and the 2018 reform effort similarly focused on eliminating the state of incorporation as a venue option, with the latter bipartisan bill having the support of thenVice President Biden in a historic policy reversal.88 But ultimately, all prior attempts at reforming bankruptcy venue
failed.89
The current version of the proposed reform comes at a time
of urgency, with many urging caution with a looming recession
and the anticipated “avalanche of mega cases” that will likely
arise once federal financial assistance ceases.90 The Senate91 and
House92 bills are virtually identical,93 and both criticize the wide
range of permissible bankruptcy venues outside of the debtor’s
home district. Forum shopping and the inadvertent “concentration of bankruptcy cases in a limited number of districts,”94 they
argue, prevent stakeholders from “fully participating in bankruptcy cases that have tremendous impacts on their lives, comvenue-reform-act-of-2021-could-mean-for-corporate-debtors [https://perma.cc/
PQW2-FQHD].
84 Id. For a publicly traded company, the principal place of business would
presumably be the location listed on its SEC filings. Id.
85 Ivan J. Reich, Making the Case for Bankruptcy Venue Reform, 28 COM. L. LEAGUE
AM. 7, 8 (2013).
86 Id. at 8, 8 n.14 (2013).
87 Id.
88 Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 467.
89 See Skeel, supra note 4.
90 See Brian Davidoff, Elissa Miller & Zev Shechtman, It’s Time for Congress to
Address Bankruptcy Venue, L.A. & S.F. DAILY J. (Nov. 23, 2020), https://
www.greenbergglusker.com/content/uploads/2021/05/Its-time-for-Congress-toaddress-bankruptcy-venue-11.23.2020-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GXP8-KK79].
91 See generally S. 2827, 117th Cong. (2021). Only the Senate Bill’s provisions
will be referenced throughout this discussion for ease of reading.
92 See generally H.R. 4193, 117th Cong. (2021).
93 Compare S. 2827, with H.R. 4193.
94 S. 2827 § 2(a)(4).
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munities, and local economies.”95 The drafters of the bills boldly
proclaim that this much-needed reform to bankruptcy venue
would reduce “forum shopping . . . [and] strengthen the integrity of, and build public confidence and ensure fairness in, the
bankruptcy system.”96 Under the current venue provision, the
definition of domicile allows the state of incorporation to be a
possible venue for the debtor.97 The bills, mainly targeting corporate debtors, propose to eliminate the state of incorporation
and curtail the use of affiliate filings to confer venue in favor of
prescribing venue solely through the principal place of business
or location of principal assets.98 One last proposed modification
to the existing text is the substitution of the word “may” in favor
of “shall” in mandating the court to dismiss or immediately
transfer the case upon finding venue is improper, removing any
discretionary power of the court in that regard.99
While some of the changes might appear subtle, removing the
state of incorporation would, in essence, drastically reshape the
bankruptcy landscape and partially bar entry into the courts of
Delaware and the Southern District of New York, despite Delaware being the favored place of incorporation for corporate entities nationwide. The National Association of Attorneys General
welcomed this reform and showed great support across state
lines and political parties.100 The attorneys similarly denounced
“rampant forum shopping” and more specifically, the incorporation of a single subsidiary by a parent company in a favored jurisdiction exclusively for filing purposes.101 A compelling point
they raise, which does not appear in either bill, is that the
debtor’s “ability to control the law to be applied to one’s affairs”
and the “releases . . . to provide to its officers, insiders, and nondebtor third parties . . . [are] not allowed in any other area of the
law.”102 Nonetheless, while agreeing that judges in other districts
are as competent as those in magnet districts, their letter contrasted with comments made by some proponents of reform
Id. § 2(a)(5)(A).
Id. § 2(a)(6).
97 See 11 U.S.C. § 1408(1).
98 See, e.g., S. 2827 § 1408(a)–(b).
99 See id. § 1412(b).
100 Letter from National Association of Attorneys General to U.S. House of
Representatives and U.S. Senate (Nov. 9, 2021) [hereinafter NAAG Letter],
https://www.naag.org/policy-letter/naag-endorses-bankruptcy-venue-reform-actof-2021 [https://perma.cc/CZ5R-JWPX].
101 Id.
102 Id. (emphasis added).
95
96
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such as LoPucki;103 the Attorneys General admitted that judges
in New York and Delaware were in fact exposed to “heightened
scrutiny and criticism,”104 thus undermining the claim of questionable integrity and motives of judges in handling complex
cases.
Two schools of thought have emerged on the need to reform
bankruptcy venue.105 The “race to the bottom” view condemns
the current venue statute and denounces its undermining of the
bankruptcy system’s overall fairness and integrity.106 On the
other end of the spectrum are “race to the top” theorists who
stress the various advantages that current venue offers forum
shoppers seeking efficiency, predictability, and expediency in restructuring.107 A closer look at the debate surrounding bankruptcy venue reform highlights some key features of forum
shopping that may appear detrimental to local actors affected by
the debtor’s choice of venue.108 However, this “race to the bottom” theory falls short of the compelling rationale by critics of
reform, exemplifying how forum shopping has allowed the
United States to acquire expertise and leave a mark on insolvency law worldwide.109
B.

RACE

TO THE

BOTTOM . . .

The overwhelming concentration of Chapter 11 cases can be
found in the magnet districts of Delaware and the Southern District of New York given their ties to corporate law and financial
institutions.110 It is important to note that other districts, such as
the Southern District of Texas and the Eastern District of Virginia, are also slowly emerging as popular venues for restructuring.111 Reform proponents wholeheartedly condemn this
“bankruptcy à la carte”112 phenomenon created by forum shopping, coining the impact on the bankruptcy system as a “race to
the bottom.”113 The most recurring arguments against forum
See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 465.
See NAAG Letter, supra note 100.
105 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 465, 472.
106 Id. at 465.
107 Id. at 472.
108 Id. at 465.
109 Id. at 506.
110 See Skeel, supra note 4.
111 Id.
112 Melissa B. Jacoby, Shocking Business Bankruptcy Law, 131 YALE L.J.F. 409, 419
(2021).
113 ABI Report, supra note 19, at 311.
103
104
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shopping are the increased costs of litigating in limited venues,
the decrease in competition and the lagging variety in precedent, the “cherry-picking” of judges, and the inability of local
parties of interest to participate in the process—overall, critics
allege that forum shopping negatively impacts public confidence in the bankruptcy system.114 While those arguments are
not without merit, a closer look at the scholarly debate in juxtaposition to skeptics of reform will demonstrate why forum shopping is in fact beneficial to the bankruptcy system.115
One of the first facets of the “race to the bottom” theory is the
alleged increase in expenses and fees resulting from debtors
picking venues far from their home districts.116 The increased
cost of litigating a Chapter 11 case does not stand on its own,
but rather, it is directly tied to the financial cost to local parties
of interest.117 This due process argument mainly rests upon the
idea that bankruptcy is not just a private, contractual matter but
involves the public.118 Proponents of reform assert that the filing
of cases miles away from employees, communities, and key constituencies essentially strips them of a meaningful opportunity to
participate in the case, or forces them to do so at a difficult and
expensive cost.119 While the theory acknowledges that “rocket
dockets” in magnet districts permit judges to move through
cases quickly, the ability of affected parties to be heard becomes
undeniably limited.120
Some proponents of reform acknowledge that the technological advances brought by the pandemic have allowed for more
virtual hearings and appearances, thus lessening the negative
impact on local constituents wishing to participate in Chapter
11 proceedings.121 However, they caution that the due process
issues of forum shopping will reemerge when in-person hearings
resume even if some adaptations are retained.122 While many
courts have resumed in-person hearings, the viability of virtual
participation by litigants has proven to be efficient over the past
two years and could very well be adopted as a new way of practic114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 470.
See id. at 506.
Reich, supra note 86, at 9.
Id.
See id.
ABI Report, supra note 19, at 311.
See Davidoff, Miller & Shechtman, supra note 90.
See NAAG Letter, supra note 100.
See id.
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ing law. While criticizing the effect forum shopping has on local
parties, some proponents go as far as claiming that the New
York–Delaware “duopoly” stands as an attack on the federal system of bankruptcy altogether.123 As the home to financial institutions and corporate industries, these states’ duopoly is
perceived by some as a prominent factor in lessening consideration of other stakeholders, mainly employees, retirees, vendors,
and local communities.124 Furthermore, proponents of reform
denounce those magnet districts as depriving local economies of
financial benefits,125 and criticize the resulting sharp increase in
administrative costs, claiming that the practice forces certain
debtors to liquidate to account for fees.126
While the overcrowding of those magnet courts may be raised
as an additional concern of forum shopping, a debtor’s particular selection, not just of venue but also of judges, is most heavily
criticized due to the unfairness it allegedly creates.127 Some suggest an implicit distrust emanating from parties of interest, who
often feel “victimized;” this feeling is only exacerbated when rulings are issued by a judge who is cautiously picked by the forumshopping debtor.128 In addition, proponents rightfully argue
that the fairness of restructuring is further undermined when a
debtor’s choice of venue mainly rests on locating favorable precedent on a particular issue.129 While predictability sought by
the DIP in handling restructuring cases may not be as nefarious
as described by reform proponents, one counterargument
stresses that judges in magnet districts possess less knowledge on
other states’ laws regarding property rights, energy-related issues, or mechanics’ liens.130 This further demonstrates how locality is central to resolving many of the issues emerging in a
Chapter 11 restructuring, which forum shopping jeopardizes. In
addition, the expertise acquired by magnet judges is interpreted
by some as increased receptiveness to legal arguments advanced
See Reich, supra note 86, at 10–11.
Id. at 10.
125 Id. at 11 (estimating that Wilmington, Delaware, receives a $100 million
economic boost each year from bankruptcy cases).
126 Id.
127 NAAG Letter, supra note 100.
128 See id.
129 See Susan Mathews, Corporate Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: The Case for Venue Reform, ABFJOURNAL (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.abfjournal.com/articles/corporate-chapter-11-bankruptcies-the-case-for-venue-reform [https://perma.cc/
UG46-R9GR].
130 See id.
123
124
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by sophisticated parties, further undermining the fairness of the
bankruptcy process.131 The lack of meaningful ties to the
debtor’s business or operations, as well as to the areas where
financial distress might be felt the hardest, can be partially supported by empirical data showing an increasing trend in filings
outside of the principal place of business in favor of New York
and Delaware.132 Some proponents of the “race to the bottom”
theory reject critics’ view that New York and Delaware are
picked as venues for efficiency and convenience; rather, they
suggest that debtors seek to avail themselves of the expertise of
bankruptcy judges and avoid the debtor’s local bankruptcy
judges.133 While this remark might be partly sustained, it appears difficult to discern a real issue because picking a more
neutral forum that is free of local political considerations often
would seem to be a more suitable alternative in favor of forum
shopping.
A more cynical approach to forum shopping comes from
scholar Lynn LoPucki, who infamously questioned the integrity
of justices in magnet districts.134 Despite having been coined an
“offensive fantasy” by a few,135 his criticism partly denounces
larger restructurings being filed in locations solely for the benefit of a debtor corporation’s officers and stakeholders.136 As a
proponent of the notion that forum shopping poses a threat to
the integrity of the bankruptcy system, he further suggests that a
liberal construction of venue fosters competition for high-profile cases, leading to the creation of elitist firms.137 While not
See Davidoff, Miller & Shechtman, supra note 90.
See Matthews, supra note 129 (showing that 70% of public companies during 2009–2014 filed in districts other than the district where their principal place
of business or principal assets were located, and 80% of these cases were filed in
either the Southern District of New York or the District of Delaware).
133 ABI Report, supra note 19, at 311 n.1084 (citing Theodore Eisenberg &
Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large
Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 1001–02 (1999) (supporting
this view with empirical research)).
134 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 465 n.5 (citing Randles, supra note 69
(quoting LoPucki: “The leading bankruptcy lawyers tell the judges what to do . . .
[t]hey’re not asking, they’re telling.”)).
135 See id. at 466 n.11 (citing Randles, supra note 69 (quoting LoPucki: “The
leading bankruptcy lawyers tell the judges what to do . . . [t]hey’re not asking,
they’re telling.”)).
136 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 465; Mark Pfeiffer, Let’s Talk About
Chapter 11 Venue Again, ABI J., May 2020, at 20 (citing ABI Report, supra note 19,
at 312) (stating that creditors filing in New York or Delaware receive 25% less
than those filing outside those locations)).
137 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 133, at 1001–02.
131
132
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substantially unfounded, LoPucki’s claim would call into question the integrity of bankruptcy judges and the prestige of the
federal bench that subjects judges to high moral and ethical
principles, but nothing suggests that bankruptcy judges’ behavior could reasonably be called into question. Lastly, LoPucki’s
suggested manipulation of the place of filing to evade one’s
creditors was strictly rejected by Judge Gropper in his 2003 decision, noting that improper venue could always be fixed by dismissing the case or transferring it in the interest of justice.138
One of the most sensible arguments made by “race to the bottom” theorists is the limited diversity in judicial opinions since
“complex and novel issues of law” tend to be decided in the
same magnet districts.139 Some comments further support the
congressional findings calling for restoring the bankruptcy system’s integrity and the public confidence in it.140 Reform advocates insist on the inability to assess differing views on appeal as
a result of cases being concentrated in the same magnet districts, with debtors picking “the initial . . . [and] the final arbiter
of their fate.”141 Nonetheless, in contrast, proponents of the
“race to the top” put forward a list of factors that demonstrate
how forum shopping remains vital to maintaining the attractiveness of Chapter 11, especially when making the case for foreign
airlines availing themselves of U.S. courts.
C.

. . . OR

THE

TOP?

Supporters of forum shopping often describe the flexibility in
venue selection as facilitating the “most effective and value-maximizing reorganization” to the debtor, arguably the most important objective when assisting a business experiencing financial
distress.142 In addition, the geographic diversity of corporate entities, spread across the country and even the world, makes
places like New York and Delaware the obvious choices for restructuring because they are hubs for financial institutions and
See id.; In re Avianca, 303 B.R. 1, 13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
See Mark A. Salzberg & Kyle F. Arendsen, Bankruptcy Venue “Reform” – What
Are the Odds This Time?, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 5, 2021), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/bankruptcy-venue-reform-what-are-odds-time
[https://perma.cc/3LW8-KJ35].
140 See S. 2827, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(4)–(6) (2021).
141 See NAAG Letter, supra note 100.
142 See ABI Report, supra note 19, at 312 (citing Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations,
94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1357, 1359 (2000)).
138
139
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corporations.143 Overall, those magnet districts offer expediency
of cases, strong precedents that coincide with increasing predictability, and judges with expertise. These advantages paired with
a lack of national uniformity on key legal bankruptcy issues144
make the perfect case in favor of forum shopping.
Magnet districts undeniably excel in their efficient administration of complex cases. While rejecting the argument that judges
in other districts are not as competent, opponents of reform acknowledge that judges in New York and Delaware are exposed
to “heightened scrutiny and criticism.”145 Most importantly, they
sharply condemn the idea that those same judges might be corrupt or improperly influenced when picking cases to make their
district more attractive.146 Despite the apparent bias that an editorial by the New York City Bar Committee might hold, it does
validly support the argument that venue does not play a role in
higher professional fees, as LoPucki suggested, by stressing the
role of both the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Department of Justice in tracking abuses of power.147 In addition,
the expediency of prepackaged restructuring plans (prepared in
cooperation with the debtor’s creditors prior to filing) in Delaware positively contributes to an “economic and efficient administration of the estate,” identified as a key factor by several
courts.148 While an efficient economic administration may be
143 See generally William J. Moon, Delaware’s Global Competitiveness, 106 IOWA L.
REV. 1683, 1685–92 (2021).
144 See, e.g., Brian Honea & Marcy Ford, Counsel’s Corner: Lack of Uniformity in
Bankruptcy Laws, CFPB Rules Challenging Servicers, DSNEWS: DAILY DOSE (Feb. 20,
2015), https://dsnews.com/news/02-20-2015/counsels-corner-lack-uniformitybankruptcy-laws-cfpb-rules-challenging-servicers [https://perma.cc/X6VAABSB].
145 NAAG Letter, supra note 100; see also N.Y.C. BAR, REPORT ON LEGISLATION BY
THE BANKRUPTCY AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION COMMITTEE 1, 6 (2018),
https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees/reports-listing/reports/detail/report-opposing-the-bankruptcy-venue-reform-act-of-2018
[https://perma.cc/2KXE-DMGP].
146 N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 145, at 6.
147 See id. (rejecting the competition argument as unfounded and citing to significant safeguards in the Bankruptcy Code shielding restructuring processes
from abuse by unscrupulous judges, if there are any); see also NAAG Letter, supra
note 100.
148 See, e.g., VanLare & Murtagh, supra note 65, at 28–29 (quoting Puerto Rico
v. Commonwealth Oil Refin. Co. (In re Commonwealth Oil Refin. Co.), 596 F.2d
1239, 1247 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing how “[t]he economic administration of
the estate” is one the most important factors in considering the appropriateness
of venue, even when going counter to the overwhelming majority of
stakeholders)).
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important when choosing a venue, it can be subject to transfer
“in the interest of justice,”149 especially in cases of “manufactured venue.”150 In contrast, proponents of reform suggest that
the speed with which complex cases are handled in magnet districts leads to less consideration of junior claimants.151 In the
absence of priming liens, junior lenders would end up financing
senior lenders—who already have a monopoly—and make it less
desirable for junior lenders to try to enter the not-so-competitive
market of restructuring financing.152 Nonetheless, counterarguments make the latter claim bear not as much weight.153 For
example, opponents of reform have advised against the risk of
increasing unpredictability and inconsistency by reforming
venue as it stands today.154 The fear of losing good precedent
may force creditors to charge higher interest rates and make
lenders bear additional costs,155 which could undermine an efficient restructuring and jeopardize securing DIP financing.
Judges’ expertise is another factor strongly tipping the balance in favor of maintaining the status quo and opposing venue
reform. For instance, the complexity and volume of cases in
magnet districts allow for partial experimentation with the law
and the building of strong precedent, both of which are desirable to DIPs and creditors.156 A proponent of the bill, although
not advocating for strict venue reform, did stress that forcing
debtors into districts lacking the experience or resources to efficiently preside over sophisticated reorganizations would completely go against the proposition the Code stands for—to allow
for an efficient reorganization accommodating the needs of
both debtors and nondebtors.157 Another practitioner testified
that forcing debtors to forgo the “benefits of those sophisticated
courts and the investor confidence they bring, in favor of jurisdictions with less predictable and potentially conflicting laws”

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

See
See
See
See
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a)(1).
VanLare & Murtagh, supra note 65, at 32.
Skeel, supra note 4.
id.
N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 145, at 4–5.
at 4.
at 5–6.
Pfeiffer, supra note 136, at 20.
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would truly undermine the status and notoriety of Chapter
11.158
Another benefit of the current rules of bankruptcy venue is
the ultimate fairness of debtor choice, notwithstanding the argument that local constituencies might be undermined by forum
shopping. In fact, Chapter 11 has been described as having “enduring value as a transparent and neutral multiparty forum,”
used in its most efficient way to resolve issues of parties with
diametrically opposed interests.159 That alone ought to stand as
an illustration that today, Chapter 11 is a system through which
fairness can be achieved. Another important aspect that opponents of reform advocate for is the limitation of local bias.160 By
not having local judges who are more receptive to economic disruptions and local political pressures weigh in on those restructuring cases, magnet districts offer a neutral forum in favor of
forum shopping.161 To further undermine the importance that
reform proponents give to bankruptcy’s “public” purpose, one
must note that the proximity of the debtor to its local constituents lessens insofar as parties of interest support the debtor’s
choice of venue or have professional representation.162 While
the due process rights of employees and retirees cannot be ignored, the complexity of entities’ restructuring often warrants
their representation by union representatives, especially in
larger cases seeking to reject CBAs.163
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s failure to address many of the
local inconsistencies in applying federal bankruptcy principles
exacerbates the lack of nationwide uniformity, further enticing
debtors to avail themselves of districts they perceive more predictable and receptive to their needs.164 One example where disparity among circuits persists is in the adoption or rejection of
critical contracts under Section 365. For example, some courts
disagree over what a debtor might do when lacking
counterparty consent; some courts dispense the debtor of such
formality by showing it does not wish to assign the contract to a
158 Mathews, supra note 129, at n.9 (citing to comments made by Michael Luskin for the New York City Bar Association’s Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization).
159 Miller & Waisman, supra note 24, at 169.
160 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 475.
161 See id.
162 See VanLare & Murtagh, supra note 65, at 30.
163 Id.
164 Andy Dietderich, “Confessions” of a Forum-Shopper: Part I, 40 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 28, 52 (2021).
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third party, whereas other courts render the contract nonassignable without counterparty consent.165 This major difference in
interpretation can lead to a massive loss of revenue for the
debtor experiencing financial distress, putting critical contracts
at risk and preventing the introduction of prepackaged plans
shown to contribute to the efficiency of the bankruptcy system
overall.166
Another point of disagreement among circuits shows how forum shopping might be the best alternative absent national consensus. As proponents of reform agree, local constituencies and
employees are entitled to due process, and their interest in preserving their employment is key.167 Nonetheless, circuits rule differently on whether priority should be granted to workers’
severance pay.168 Often, severance becomes an unsecured claim
and thus lacks priority in repayment, which might encourage
layoffs by enticing certain debtors and secured creditors to favor
Delaware as a venue to benefit from this “window of opportunity.”169 In comparison, New York includes severance as a cost of
reorganization, making it a key difference between the two magnet districts.170
Lastly, two substantive issues further illustrate the absence of
uniformity in applying bankruptcy provisions nationwide: sales
“free and clear” and third-party releases. A split in authority on
the meaning of “greater than the aggregate value of all liens on
the property”171 may impair the ability to buy a debtor’s assets or
property when a lien remains. While some courts understand
the provision as meaning the proposed purchase price must be
less than all liens combined, others interpret it as the value of
the business needing to be lower than the amount of secured
claims.172 Furthermore, third-party releases are a system through
which parties not having undertaken the burden of bankruptcy
are being sheltered from liability by using releases from the
165 Richard Bernard, Scott Gautier & Vince Slusher, Important Consideration Regarding Pending Bankruptcy Venue Reform Legislation, N.Y.L.J. (June 4, 2021), https:/
/www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X9GR8ROK000000?jcsearch=GLm45egh
ihk#jcite [https://perma.cc/9PLX-Y5XD].
166 See Dietderich, supra note 164, at 28–29.
167 See id. at 29.
168 See id. at 29–30, 52.
169 See id. at 52.
170 See id.
171 See Bernard, Gautier & Slusher, supra note 165; 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3).
172 See Bernard, Gautier & Slusher, supra note 165.
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debtor’s senior creditors to fund mass tort settlements.173 This
very controversial tool has led to heated debates and discrepancies among courts on how inclined they are to enforce thirdparty releases.174 While some unfavorable forums choose not to
enforce those releases, others do by considering the value third
parties bring to the reorganization and whether such releases
may be essential to the restructuring effort.175
While not devoid of any bias, the discussion of forum shopping and venue reform by the Governor of Delaware and the
New York City Bar perfectly concludes the case in favor of the
“race to the top” theory.176 For the proposed Bankruptcy Venue
Reform of 2018, Governor Carney cautioned against barring access to Delaware courts, a “world-class bench and bar with exceptional expertise in corporate legal issues and bankruptcy.”177 He
argued that the reform would restrict optional venues to businesses and hurt the U.S. economy, considering that over twothirds of American businesses in the Fortune 500 are incorporated in Delaware.178 In addition, bearing the importance of local constituencies in mind, the “blow” to the Delaware economy
and the impact on businesses and people serving restructuring
would be considerable according to Governor Carney’s statement.179 Similarly, the New York City Bar emphasized that the
Bill represented a “radical departure from longstanding [venue]
practice” that would “impair corporate debtors’ ability to maximize their creditors’ recoveries,” and would not act in furtherance of advancing the interests of employees, who are often far
from the debtor’s principal place of business or assets.180 FurSee, e.g., id.
Cf. Jacoby, supra note 112, at 413 (claiming third-party releases violate the
goal of a Chapter 11 filing of “resolving overindebtedness”).
175 See Bernard, Gautier & Slusher, supra note 165 (noting the overwhelming
support of the plan by affected creditors is an additional factor in favor of approving third-party releases).
176 See generally Governor Carney, Congressional Delegation Respond to Bill That
Would Hurt U.S. Economy, Change Bankruptcy Venue Laws, OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR
(Jan. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Gov. Carney Statement], https://news.delaware.gov/
2018/01/08/venue-options-bill/ [https://perma.cc/2LM6-Q3LE]; N.Y.C. BAR,
supra note 145, at 1.
177 See Gov. Carney Statement, supra note 176.
178 Id.
179 See id. (citing to Professor of Law David Skeel, who testified to the House of
Representatives that strict venue reform would “undermine the effectiveness
of . . . [the] corporate bankruptcy system . . . [and] increase the administrative
costs”).
180 See N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 145, at 1.
173
174

620

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[87

ther arguing on behalf of bankruptcy’s public purpose, the
statement stressed local constituents’ ample ability to participate
in restructuring proceedings through virtual court appearances
and case information accessible online.181 This very sharp remark further discredits “race to the bottom” theorists’ view that
forum shopping undermines the public purpose of the bankruptcy system.182
Bankruptcy may not be perceived solely as having a private
purpose; in fact, the public facets of restructuring become key to
an efficient administration of the debtor’s estate. Nonetheless,
the “race to the top” theory is directly correlated to the attractiveness of the U.S. system offering predictability, efficiency, and
expertise to both domestic and foreign entities seeking restructuring assistance.183 Further, an attempt at reforming bankruptcy venue could jeopardize the country’s place on the global
insolvency stage.184 The risk of removing the state of incorporation as a proper venue would ultimately bar many foreign entities from accessing U.S. courts. It would present foreign airlines
like Avianca or Philippine Airlines with a single alternative—to
forum shop globally—harming U.S. creditors and hurting the
United States’ dominance in aviation.
IV.

RISK OF GLOBAL FORUM SHOPPING

As the debate on venue shopping reform myopically rages in
the United States, its impact could be felt on a global scale. Not
only would a reform of bankruptcy venue impact which courts
domestic debtors could avail themselves of, but it would risk
prompting a phenomenon of global forum shopping. As the
field becomes more level and foreign jurisdictions emerge as insolvency hubs, one may wonder not if but rather when companies will start restructuring somewhere outside the United
States.185 Note that for the first time in bankruptcy history, a

See id. at 2.
See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 465 (citing Randles, supra note 69
(quoting LoPucki: “The leading bankruptcy lawyers tell the judges what to do . . .
[t]hey’re not asking, they’re telling”)).
183 Id. at 466.
184 Id. at 467–68.
185 Michael Berthiaume, Proposed Legislation May Trip-up International Bankruptcy
Filings in the United States, in INT’L RESTRUC. NEWSWIRE, 25, 25–26 (2021).
181
182
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U.S.-headquartered company selected the United Kingdom’s
(U.K.’s) model for restructuring in 2019.186
A.
1.

DOMESTIC VENUE REFORM POSING
ENTITIES

A

THREAT

TO

FOREIGN

The Rise of Global Forum Shopping

The proposed bankruptcy venue reform would bar foreign
debtors from accessing U.S. courts; those debtors may no longer
qualify absent tangible assets in the United States, or they may
be forced into unusual and inconvenient districts outside of Delaware and New York.187 Senator Warren described Chapter 11 as
belonging in “the pantheon of extraordinary laws that have
shaped the American economy and society [that] then echoed
throughout the world . . . [exemplifying the] myth [of] the pioneer making a fresh start on the boundless prairie.”188 It begs
the question of why risk the United States’ position as a major
force in corporate restructuring and change a system that has
worked for decades at a moment of critical uncertainty worldwide. While it may not seem problematic at first, global forum
shopping would undermine the position of the United States as
the benchmark in restructuring matters, ultimately running the
risk of both hurting U.S. creditors and undermining the country’s role in the spheres of insolvency and aviation.
Despite the United States remaining the preferred forum for
corporate restructuring thus far, practitioners have noted the
rise of foreign forums becoming increasingly competitive.189
One explanation for this trend towards a globalization of the
bankruptcy industry comes from those that dictate venue issues
globally—not legislatures but jurisdictions controlling “large
186 Simon Thomas & Oonagh Steel, Could Syncreon Lead to More U.S. Companies
Using English Schemes?, GLOB. RESTRUC. REV. (Sept. 12, 2019), https://
globalrestructuringreview.com/could-syncreon-lead-more-us-companies-using-english-schemes [https://perma.cc/78UF-N2KT].
187 See, e.g., Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 468; Berthiaume, supra note 185,
at 25.
188 Gerard McCormack, Bankruptcy Forum Shopping: The UK and US as Venues of
Choice for Foreign Companies, 63 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 815, 827 (2014) (quoting
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge
to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 604 (2009)).
189 See generally Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Good Old Chapter 11 in
a Pre-Insolvency World: The Growth of Global Reorganization Options, 46 N.C. J. INT’L
L. 353, 366–74 (2021) (discussing the rise of global alternatives to Chapter 11
emerging as viable alternatives to the English scheme of arrangement, including
the systems in Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany).
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pools of capital waiting to be deployed in the service of distressed investing.”190 Certain locations have started to attract a
disproportionate share of restructuring cases; larger cities located near large financial centers and capital pools perceived as
business friendly have emerged in direct competition with the
United States.191 Those larger restructuring cases have progressively parted from an optic towards reorganizing for one of finding a “vehicle for ‘financial play,’ ” ultimately encouraging a war
over venue location.192 The winner of this forum war is predicted to be the country that (1) controls capital pools and (2)
offers a bankruptcy venue with ease of access and predictability,193 the second point being undeniably undermined by the
U.S. bipartisan bill.
A few examples showcase how many foreign jurisdictions are
making a good faith effort in entering the corporate restructuring stage. Under the Canada Business Corporations Act, corporate debtors may get third-party releases,194 which remains a
highly contested issue in the United States and a factor incentivizing domestic forum shopping absent uniformity among circuits. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Act on Court Confirmation
of Extrajudicial Restructuring Plans mimics, in many ways,
Chapter 11; in addition to a DIP, it offers a stay against certain
creditors, permits the invalidation of certain ipso facto clauses,
authorizes the sale of unencumbered assets, and allows for a
cramdown plan of reorganization.195 Germany, Australia, India,
and Italy have also demonstrated their appeal in insolvency matters.196 Another prominent world player, the European Union
(EU), is worth mentioning. Despite not yet catching up to the
United States or its direct competitors, the EU’s issuance of its
2019 Restructuring Directive attempts to harmonize insolvency
laws between its member states by, for example, (a) introducing
a DIP, (b) banning ipso facto clauses, and (c) allowing for a cross190 See Bill Brandt, Forum Shopping on a Global Scale, COM. L. WORLD, July–Sept.
2019, at 20. Brandt was an advisor to Congress on insolvency policy and the principal author to the Bankruptcy Code’s amendment that allows for the election of
trustees in Chapter 11 cases. Id. He also served on the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission to reform Chapter 11. Id. His active involvement in Singaporean courts provides him with a unique perspective on the topic. See id.
191 Id. at 21.
192 See id. at 20.
193 See id. at 22.
194 Berthiaume, supra note 185, at 26.
195 See id. at 26–27.
196 See id.
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class cramdown mechanism enforceable against dissenting creditors even when they are in separate classes.197 While certain of
the aforementioned reforms might seem attractive to foreign
debtors experiencing financial distress, they nonetheless lack
the substantial appeal of DIP financing, the automatic stay, and
the expertise that an American forum would traditionally
provide.
This global forum shopping phenomenon is well at our doorstep and may even be deemed to threaten the prominence of
the United States at a time when many nations are evolving in
the competitive insolvency marketplace. While domestic districts
are limited in their ability to change bankruptcy precedents emanating from federal law, foreign forums are not similarly constrained. Three main localities are on the rise as direct
competitors to the United States: the U.K., Hong Kong, and Singapore, with the latter already “stealing” bankruptcy judges from
our magnet districts for the benefit of the Singapore International Commercial Court.198
2.

The United Kingdom and Singapore: The Two Rising Stars

The first forum presenting a competitive risk to our magnet
districts is the U.K., offering to the debtor both liquidation and
administrative restructuring alternatives, and keeping the rescue
of the company as an ongoing concern.199 Up until 2020, the
U.K. solely offered a scheme of arrangement to the distressed
debtor; this insolvency proceeding allowed for the modification
of creditors’ rights upon approval by (1) a majority in number
of each class of creditors and (2) at least 75% in value of the
debt held by the creditors at voting (a form of DIP restructuring) irrespective of the debtor’s solvency or creditors’ unanimity
in assenting to secured interests being written off.200 In other
words, a debtor not yet experiencing financial distress, but hop197 Matthew Thorn & Manhal Zaman, And, More Keeping Up with the Joneses: The
New EU Restructuring Directive and Reforms in the United Kingdom, in INT’L RESTRUC.
NEWSWIRE 11, 11 (2019).
198 Daniel Gill, Judge Christopher Sontchi Retiring from Delaware Bankruptcy Bench,
BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 15, 2021), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/bankruptcy-law/XBUTSJAS000000?bna_news_filter=bankruptcy-law
#jcite [https://perma.cc/Z24T-E9WU] (Judge Sontchi will leave the Delaware
bench for Singapore while retaining a role as a mediator and arbitrator in
Delaware).
199 See McCormack, supra note 188, at 824–25.
200 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 488–89 (note that the “irrespective of
the debtor’s insolvency” qualifier is unique to the U.K. scheme).
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ing to avoid such unfortunate event, could avail itself of the U.K.
scheme, making it a powerful restructuring tool despite the lack
of a cramdown provision.201 The high degree of public disclosure, limited judicial oversight, and speedy resolution made the
scheme a popular alternative, with the court merely acting as a
monitoring body and giving vast flexibility to the negotiating
debtor.202 The likelihood that the scheme of arrangement will
be recognized and enforced by foreign jurisdictions, including
the United States, made it a useful tool to resolve mostly intraclass holdout problems involving labor contracts or discharging environmental obligations.203 In other words, the U.K.
scheme was not a true adversary to the magnet districts, but remained a decent restructuring tool.204
However, the most significant change to British insolvency law
unquestionably came in 2020, with the amendment of Part 26A
of the U.K. Companies Act of 2006.205 This innovation to the
U.K.’s new restructuring plan adds a cross-class cramdown
mechanism, vastly mimicking features of Chapter 11’s own
cramdown provision.206 While a court retains oversight power
over the restructuring plan and process through two court hearings pending approval, the new U.K. model bears heavy resemblance to Chapter 11.207 The U.K. DIP is similar to the United
States one because directors of the company proposing the plan
remain in control during the restructuring process.208 While the
United States retains exclusivity in having an automatic stay effective immediately upon filing, the U.K. model offers a moratorium preventing the enforcement of certain legal proceedings,
securities, and forfeiture of leases.209
While the new U.K. model offers undeniable benefits, it nonetheless falls short of Chapter 11’s superiority. Despite the introSee id. at 489.
See Thomas & Steel, supra note 186.
203 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 490.
204 See id.
205 See Judah Frogel, Daniel Guyder, Jennifer Marshall & Shaheen Karolia, Restructuring Across the Pond and Back: A Comparison of Chapter 11 and the New UK Act,
in LENDING & SECURED FIN. 100, 100 (9th ed. 2021), https://iclg.com/practiceareas/lending-and-secured-finance-laws-and-regulations/15-restructuring-acrossthe-pond-and-back-a-comparison-of-chapter-11-and-the-new-uk-act [https://
perma.cc/Y5E4-KY4X].
206 Id.
207 See id. at 100–01.
208 See id. at 101.
209 See id.
201
202
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duction of a cross-class cramdown provision, a British court
retains incredible discretionary power in approving the plan in
comparison to its American counterpart.210 Whereas Chapter 11
would not permit a junior class of creditors to recover unless all
senior claims were satisfied in full, a U.K. plan is not subject to
the same absolute priority rule.211 While the British court must
consider principles of equity and fairness, such discretionary
power undermines the reliability upon which a foreign debtor
may expect confirmation of its plan.212 Despite less expensive
filing fees, the major flaw of the U.K. restructuring plan rests on
its lack of DIP financing alternatives, which has made the
United States an attractive venue to foreign entities.213 American
bankruptcy courts remain the standard when DIP financing is
required because the U.K. model neither provides higher priority to restructuring financing nor imposes new obligations on
creditors to advance money.214 While subtle differences persist
between the new U.K. insolvency cramdown model and the infamous Chapter 11, the U.K. cramdown model’s success has already been demonstrated. For example, DeepOcean Group, a
popular provider of subsea services in the oil and gas and renewable industries, successfully completed the first reorganization
effort using the U.K. cramdown restructuring tool in January
2021, firmly establishing the tool’s presence on the international restructuring scene.215
The second actor attempting to mimic Chapter 11 and establish its presence as the restructuring hub in the Asia–Pacific region is Singapore, which has strong and efficient insolvency
processes.216 In its attempt to surpass Hong Kong, which has allegedly lagged in joining modern insolvency trends and parting
See id. at 103.
See id. at 103; 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
212 Frogel et al., supra note 205, at 103–04.
213 See Adam Gallagher, Toby Smyth & Madlyn Gleich Primoff, Is the New UK
Restructuring Plan a Viable Alternative to Chapter 11?, 39 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 69
(2020).
214 See id.; see also Frogel et al., supra note 205, at 103–04.
215 See James Stonebridge, Deep Ocean – The First UK Cross-Class Cram-Down Case
Under the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, in INT’L RESTRUC. NEWSWIRE
9, 10–12 (2021).
216 Scott Atkins & Kai Luck, Cross-Border Insolvency in Hong Kong: Common Law
Limitations and How the Model Law Could Drive Foreign Investment and Economic
Growth, in INT’L RESTRUC. NEWSWIRE 11, 13 (2021). Singapore ranks 27th for perceived strength and efficiency of its insolvency laws and processes on the World
Bank’s 2020 Estimate of Doing Business rankings. Id. at 14.
210
211
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from a common law framework,217 Singapore has attracted
worldwide business and legal communities, making it one of the
top destinations for corporate restructurings.218 For the first
time, Singaporean law authorizes the protection of new capital
in an effort to “prime existing creditors,” creating in effect a
lending arrangement unequivocally resembling DIP financing.219 Singapore further enhanced its attractiveness as a primary destination for the flow of foreign capital in 2017 by
adopting the Model Law, which seeks to permit the recognition
of foreign insolvency proceedings, the ability to take control of
assets of foreign companies located in Model Law jurisdictions,
and the pursuit of investigations and recovery proceedings per
local insolvency laws of a member jurisdiction.220
In conclusion, the similarities Singaporean insolvency laws
bear to Chapter 11’s automatic stay, cramdown mechanism, and
procedures for approving prepackaged plans221 allow only one
conclusion: Singapore is threatening the United States’ place as
the golden standard in restructuring. It appears almost impossible to think of a reorganization scheme that would mimic Chapter 11 more, with the exception of Chapter 11 itself. A closer
look at the U.K.’s new insolvency law and the Singaporean
model of restructuring leaves one wondering what remedies
might be available to prevent corporate debtors from fleeing to
foreign forums and preserve the United States’ expertise and
reputation.
B.

SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES

TO

VENUE REFORM

As demonstrated, the threat of global forum shopping is wellestablished because the U.K., Singapore, and (to a certain extent) Hong Kong are progressively emerging as strong alternatives to a Chapter 11 restructuring.222 Reforming bankruptcy
venue could alter the course of restructuring as we know it today. As previously demonstrated, magnet districts offer exper217 See id. at 14; see also Scott Atkins, Camille Jojo, Kai Luck & Daniel Ng, Hong
Kong Advances Its Restructuring Credentials in Its New Cross Border Insolvency Framework with Mainland China, in INT’L RESTRUC. NEWSWIRE 12, 12 (2021) (discussing
Hong Kong increasing its ties to China by starting to recognize their insolvency
proceedings by, for instance, staying garnishment by a creditor against a Hong
Kong debtor after a liquidation process had been started in China).
218 See Brandt, supra note 190, at 21.
219 See id.
220 See Atkins & Luck, supra note 216, at 11, 13.
221 Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 490.
222 See Brandt, supra note 190, at 21.
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tise, predictability, and expediency in the administration of
complex cases—all desirable to a debtor experiencing financial
distress.223 Other factors strongly suggest that bankruptcy venue
might not be an issue at all. First, venue can be changed, and a
case can be dismissed to another jurisdiction in the interest of
justice or, in some cases, of the parties of interest.224 Second, the
complex corporate structure of large debtors includes subsidiaries in various locations and a wide array of contracts subject to
different forum clauses, making it more practical to handle
those cases in districts home to corporations and financial institutions.225 And third, bankruptcy venue does not usually involve
a typical two-party adversarial proceedings where traditional
nonbankruptcy venue rules would make sense.226
Given the ramifications that this bankruptcy venue reform
would have on global forum shopping, it is wise to consider
other alternatives that would remedy some of the issues that
“race to the bottom” theorists have identified while also safeguarding the reputation and desirability of American bankruptcy courts. One proposition would be rather simple: resolve
the circuit splits on material issues such as critical contracts and
third-party releases.227 Forum shopping often occurs when a
debtor is seeking favorable legal precedent on a particular issue,
a practice that proponents of reform have condemned over
time.228 By letting the legislature amend the Code or having the
Supreme Court grant certiorari on those particularly contentious issues, debtors would have less incentives to avail themselves of Delaware or New York courts and could keep their
restructuring more local.229 It is important to note that, contrary
to venue, third-party releases and severance pay have been subject to less scrutiny and have not particularly garnered the attenSee supra Section III.C.
Kenneth A. Rosen & Philip J. Gross, Bankruptcy Venue Reform Bill Needs
Amending, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER (Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.lowenstein.com/
news-insights/publications/articles/bankruptcy-venue-reform-bill-needs-amending-rosen-gross [https://perma.cc/67EJ-JCTX].
225 See id.
226 See id.
227 See, e.g., Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 496–98; Bernard, Gautier &
Slusher, supra note 165; Dietderich, supra note 164, at 29, 52.
228 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 496 (citing Karen M. Gebbia, Certiorari
and the Bankruptcy Code: The Statutory Interpretation Cases, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 503,
510 (2016)).
229 See id.
223
224
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tion of politicians or voters,230 making it more likely that a
successful amendment of the Code would prevail.
Another remedy that has been suggested for decades is the
notion of ex ante commitment: having debtors and creditors
agree to a proper restructuring venue prior to the onset of financial distress.231 Rasmussen and Thomas were the first to suggest that this approach would incentivize parties of interest “to
select the venue which promises to maximize the value of the
firm as a whole.”232 Timing is absolutely critical to picking a restructuring venue, since the interest of a corporation’s managers
and stakeholders will likely shift as the case progresses and insolvency looms.233 Having them commit to a bankruptcy venue
before the company becomes financially distressed would shift
optics and have them look beyond mere short-term survival.234 It
has been suggested that forward planning might also benefit the
company in negotiating with its creditors; lenders would likely
be encouraged to charge lower interests rates upon picking a
restructuring venue favorable to the interests of all, adding
more securities and predictability once financial distress does
occur.235
Objectively speaking, making bankruptcy venue the product
of contractual negotiations would be a perfectly acceptable way
to fight forum shopping, let parties exercise their right to contract, and allow parties to weigh their interests while doing so. In
fact, some practitioners have supported this view and similarly
stress the importance of timing by suggesting the incorporation
of insolvency forum clauses.236 While not dispositive, those
clauses stand for the proposition that courts would take into
consideration the parties’ original intent and expectations “regarding an appropriate forum for insolvency.”237
The case of In re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc.238 illustrates
this point and suggests that the structure of modern-day corporations and parallel insolvency proceedings increase the interconnectedness and complexity of restructuring cases, making
See id. at 496–98.
See, e.g., Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 142, at 1359.
232 See id. at 1397.
233 See id. at 1396–97.
234 See id. at 1399.
235 See id. at 1400.
236 See generally Richard Levin & Carl N. Wedoff, What Did You Expect? Insolvency
Forum Clauses, 35 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 108, 108 (2016).
237 See id. at 108.
238 537 B.R. 192 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015).
230
231
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forum clauses a useful alternative.239 The case involved parties
located in numerous countries spanning the globe, with different choice of forum clauses for construction contracts, credit
agreements, and security interests.240 Despite finding that the
case was filed in good faith by a debtor “on the edge of a financial precipice,”241 the ultimate dismissal of the case rested solely
on the legitimate expectations of the creditor base, pointing at
the Bahamas as the only appropriate restructuring venue.242 The
bankruptcy judge exemplified the importance that prenegotiated insolvency clauses could offer while remaining dispositive,
stating that the “[e]xpectations of various factors—including
the expectations surrounding the question of where ultimately
disputes will be resolved—are important, should be respected, and
[should] not [be] disrupted unless a greater good is to be accomplished.”243 Adding insolvency forum clauses would account for
the importance of timing and could discourage courts from
hearing cases in unexpected forums, simultaneously incentivizing the dismissal of any case to a “proper” forum agreed to by
the parties of interest.244 Nonetheless, as the In re Northshore case
shows, those clauses are not dispositive; a court retains discretionary power in removing the case, which could still lead to
unpredictability.245
Another proposal emanating from Rasmussen and Thomas’s
ex ante commitment idea is that of Casey and Macey, who suggest
the addition of a mechanism for choosing and later amending,
when necessary, venue as a pre-insolvency commitment.246 One
contentious aspect of agreeing to a forum pre-insolvency is its
rigidity.247 Several explanations account for this and a corporate
debtor’s desire to amend the originally agreed upon venue: new
precedent might emerge and make another venue more attractive; judges’ expertise might wane as they retire; and backlog
See id. at 195–96.
Id. at 195–96.
241 Id. at 203.
242 See id. at 204–07 (holding the case brought by the Delaware LLC could be
heard by the Delaware bankruptcy judge despite removal to the Bahamas on the
real estate issue following the Bahamian Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize
the petitions or enforce the automatic stay).
243 See id. at 206 (second emphasis added).
244 See Levin & Wedoff, supra note 236, at 108.
245 See id. at 108, 110.
246 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 498.
247 Id. at 499.
239
240

630

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[87

may arise.248 Adopting a contractual approach to this problem
and creating a mechanism to amend that ex ante commitment
with a majority of creditors and stakeholders would make it as
critical as picking an original venue to guarantee a successful
restructuring.249 While this approach is sensible, some have
rightfully suggested that no corporation contemplates restructuring in its early stages, and as a result, the corporate debtor is
unlikely to know what venue will be best until deciding what the
business venture will fully entail.250 In addition, once insolvency
does become an issue, it might prove beyond difficult to get
creditors and stakeholders alike to elect a new venue.251 The
concern that such clauses might be deemed unenforceable
would seriously undermine their reliability, further increasing
unpredictability.252 It is worth noting that, just like insolvency
forum clauses, this mechanism could provide guidance to bankruptcy judges and weigh heavily in favor of upholding the parties’ expectations pre-insolvency insofar as they do not go
against the interests of justice.253
Lastly, another suggested alternative to reforming bankruptcy
venue is the creation of regional bankruptcy centers in each circuit,254 arguably the least appealing remedy presented thus far.
As debtors seek magnet districts to handle complex cases for the
expediency and expertise of judges, one option to counter forum shopping would be to remove the notion of venue having
to be assigned to a particular district.255 While not prescribed to
a specific district, those regional bankruptcy centers would include judges who are known and recommended for their expertise to assist the centers in adopting efficient rules and ensuring
sufficient staffing.256 Thus, cases would be assigned to a judge of
the regional bankruptcy center rather than one from a particular district, with appeals being redirected to the district court
where the original filing was made.257 While this suggestion does
attempt to reduce forum shopping, it begs the question of
whether it would ultimately undermine the efficiency of the
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
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See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 499.
Dietderich, supra note 164, at 52 n.7.
Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 499–500.
id. at 503 n.150.
id. at 503.
Pfeiffer, supra note 136, at 55.
id. at 21.
id. at 55.
id.
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bankruptcy system. But most importantly, it seems as if this idea
stands for the proposition that only judges deemed experienced
enough would be qualified to be appointed to regional centers
and, in a sense, to “train” other judges for efficiency and expertise purposes. One might see this proposal as suggesting certain
bankruptcy judges outside magnet districts might not be as competent, giving credence to reform proponents and contradicting
“race to the top” theorists and their rejection of this unfounded
myth.
Most alternatives to reforming bankruptcy venue emphasize
the need for a contractual approach to resolve the issue of forum shopping, absent uniformity in bankruptcy precedents.258
While “race to the top” theorists rightfully claim that forum
shopping is beneficial to the bankruptcy system overall, the revived push for reform calls for other means to accommodate the
private and public purposes of restructuring.259 Given that timing is key to an efficient plan, a pre-insolvency remedy that
might prove a viable option is an insolvency forum clause paired
with a mechanism for amendment based on shifts in precedents
and stakeholders’ objectives.260 Regardless of the means elected,
opposing the bankruptcy venue reform becomes critical to retain foreign debtors in U.S. bankruptcy courts.
C.

BUT ULTIMATELY, WHY SHOULD WE CARE?

The need to limit venue reform domestically is paramount because leaving the problem unattended would most likely make
the issue grow globally. It would risk leaving non-U.S. forums as
(1) the sole alternative to foreign debtors lacking assets in the
United States and (2) a more attractive venue for domestic debtors with an international presence.261 As such, this undesirable
outcome would endanger the United States’ place in the world
of corporate bankruptcy law because foreign debtors would be
forced to avail themselves of less reputable districts for purposes
of efficiency, expertise, and expediency.262 As to the risks it
would pose to the United States, the answer is quite simple: it
would jeopardize the country’s global presence in the aviation
industry and undermine the due process rights of U.S. creditors.
258
259
260
261
262

See, e.g., Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 142, at 1359 n.7.
See id. at 1382.
Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 498–501.
See id. at 482–84.
See id. at 493–94.
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Beyond any doubt, the United States plays a big role in the
aviation industry and the several international agencies regulating it by (a) the location of said agencies, (b) the language requirements imposed on pilots flying internationally, and (c) the
Cape Town Treaty and its regulation of aircraft leases. For instance, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) works in partnership with the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), the latter agency based both in Washington, D.C., and
Montreal, Canada, further demonstrating the geographical importance played by the United States.263 ICAO, a United Nations
(U.N.) specialized agency, was founded under the Chicago Convention of 1944 and has been central in implementing “global
standards and recommended practices applicable to international aviation [on issues of] safety, security, air traffic management, and environmental standards, among others.”264 As a
member of the governing council of ICAO, the United States
has weighed heavily on policies and guidance issued to both governments and industry operators to restart the international air
transport sector during the pandemic.265 While the U.S. Department of Transportation requires any holder of a FAA certification to “be able to communicate in English in a discernible and
understandable manner with air traffic control . . . [and] pilots,”266 ICAO has also imposed similar language requirements,
making English the “all pilots” language.267
The United States does not fall short of being the golden standard at the crossroads between insolvency and aviation. For instance, the Cape Town Treaty of 2001 and the immense
deference it gives Chapter 11 in matters of aircraft leases further
demonstrate the need to preserve the United States’ global presence in the industry.268 A particular article references the phe263 ICAO and Global Initiatives, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
headquarters_offices/apl/international_affairs/global_issues [https://perma.
cc/4YND-DEHQ].
264 Id.
265 See id.
266 FAA, ADVISORY CIRCULAR NO. 60-28B, FAA ENGLISH LANGUAGE STANDARD
FOR AN FAA CERTIFICATE ISSUED UNDER 14 CFR PARTS 61, 63, 65, and 107 (2017);
see also 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.65(2), 63.33(b), 65.33(c), 107.61(b) (2022).
267 ICAO Promotes Aviation Safety by Endorsing English Language Testing, ICAO
(Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/icao-promotes-aviationsafety-by-endorsing-english-language-testing.aspx [https://perma.cc/DM9PKS6C]).
268 See Karen McMaster, Ben Andrews & James Cameron, Aviation: Cramming
Cape Town Creditors, GLOB. RESTRUC. REV. (Dec. 15, 2020), https://globalrestructuringreview.com/review/europe-middle-east-and-africa-restructuring-review/
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nomenon of global forum shopping and comments that “the
United States has not yet lost its crown as the preferred [insolvency] safe harbor . . . within the aviation industry.”269 The
Treaty introduced the registration of international interests over
aircraft to facilitate the financing and leasing of mobile equipment of high value while providing creditors with a uniform,
international regime of enforcement.270 The most noteworthy
provision from this Treaty is Article XI, listing a creditor’s remedies when facing an insolvent debtor.271 While two alternative
regimes are made available, Alternative A is substantially the
equivalent of Section 1110 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which
governs aircraft equipment and vessels.272 The provision offers
similar protections and gives the debtor airline the opportunity
to either cure all defaults or give possession of the aircraft to the
creditor within a sixty-day period to either accept or reject its
leasing agreement.273 However, the provision requires creditors’
consent and does not offer a cramdown provision.274
In addition to the impact that reforming bankruptcy venue
could have on the United States and its input in regulating aviation, U.S. creditors and protection of their interests under the
Bankruptcy Code could be jeopardized. Indeed, forcing foreign
debtors to avail themselves of foreign forums would imperil the
enforcement of U.S. court orders and could greatly undermine
the applicability of “adequate protection”275 to U.S. creditors’
collateral. While many financial institutions and lenders have
ties to American jurisdictions (often New York or Delaware),
mobile assets, such as airplanes, pose a great risk to creditors.276
Absent an automatic stay, the planes’ ability to move across jurisdictions could lead a debtor airline to face an ineffective reorganization.277 Attempts by foreign creditors to recapture U.S.
aircraft would leave U.S. creditors without the protection of domestic courts to favorably intervene against such practice.278
2020/article/aviation-cramming-cape-town-creditors#footnote-001-backlink
[https://perma.cc/2V3E-ULUN].
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1110.
274 See McMaster, Andrews & Cameron, supra note 268.
275 See 11 U.S.C. § 361.
276 See Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 189, at 375–77.
277 See id.
278 See, e.g., id. at 379.
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While a U.S. court order would be binding on those financial
institutions and lenders having some contact with the United
States, wholly foreign-owned creditors would not be bound by a
reorganization plan or discharge, which could present another
risk to U.S. creditors.279
Despite the importance of ensuring U.S. creditors are adequately protected, a case for American imperialism should not
be advocated for when recognizing foreign insolvency proceedings. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code created Chapter 15, a separate
mechanism allowing for the recognition of foreign insolvency
proceedings and court orders.280 This process permits a nonU.S. court to serve as the main forum to a debtor’s restructuring
efforts while encouraging courts in other countries, including
the United States, to defer to and coordinate implementation.281 This principle of comity remains paramount to a nation
as greatly involved in world affairs as the United States. In fact,
the country has a national interest in facilitating international
restructuring, which strengthens cross-border financial markets
and encourages cross-border investment.282 It nonetheless remains of concern that, absent local recognition by the foreign
court supervising the debtor’s restructuring, non-U.S. creditors
with few to no ties to the United States could escape from the
reach of U.S. courts.283 In fact, comity would bar U.S. courts
from overseeing a case affecting purely local creditors if local
courts from the debtor’s home country did not actively try to
protect the interest of U.S. creditors.284
While the likelihood that a foreign creditor would completely
escape from the reach of U.S. courts is slim given the spread of
Wall Street financial products and balance sheets abroad,285
Chapter 11 remains highly predictable to international creditors. As it stands today, bankruptcy venue permits U.S. creditors
to directly seek help from U.S. domestic courts to secure their
See id. at 361.
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–32 (on Ancillary and Other Cross-Border
Cases).
281 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Bankruptcy Tourism and FNC, 3 INT’L J. PROCEDURAL L. 159, 161–62 (2013).
282 See Andy Dietderich, “Confessions” of a Forum-Shopper, Part II: Debtors Without
Borders, 40 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 62 (2021).
283 Id. at 61.
284 Id. (suggesting U.S. courts give deference to foreign jurisdictions in a very
federalist fashion, similar to the way they would in respect to states of the union).
285 See id.
279
280
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highly valued mobile aircraft.286 In addition, the prominent role
the United States plays in the aviation sphere further strengthens the case in favor of abandoning this reform project.
V.

CONCLUSION

The COVID-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on the aviation industry and with it brought the cyclical return of bankruptcy
venue reform. The recent Chapter 11 filings by Purdue Pharma
and Catholic dioceses provoked the return of a populist backlash, seemingly recurring before each new introduction of reform.287 Nonetheless, some of the support for reform by officials
in Congress and practitioners should not disillusion proponents
of the bill. They should anticipate strong resistance that could
result in the proposal’s ultimate demise, similar to other failed
attempts on record.288 Amongst those likely to oppose reform is
current U.S. President Biden, a former Senator from Delaware,
who has traditionally been a strong proponent of the current
venue rules.289
While the likelihood of venue reform’s success is debatable,
the paradigm at issue remains the same: reforming debtors’
venue selection and foreclosing their use of the state of incorporation would imperil foreign entities’ ability to avail themselves
of U.S. bankruptcy courts, ultimately damaging the global prowess occupied by the United States in restructuring and undermining the rights and remedies available to U.S. creditors.
While “race to the bottom” proponents allege that current
venue might undermine the fairness and integrity of the bankruptcy system, “race to the top” theorists make the case in favor
of expediency of cases, precedents increasing predictability, and
judicial expertise absent uniformity on key legal bankruptcy issues.290 Furthermore, several remedies have been suggested to
address forum shopping (such as ex ante agreements, insolvency
forum clauses, etc.) that should be submitted to Congress
before further amending the Code more drastically.291
Beyond the local impact that reforming venue could have, the
proposed legislation would endanger the United States’ place as
286
287
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Salzberg & Arendsen, supra note

287

See id. at 62.

139, at 3.
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the global leader in aviation and weaken the protections U.S.
laws afford U.S. creditors and aircraft lessors. While an argument for American imperialism is undesirable, maintaining the
status quo is of the utmost importance. Cases where a foreign
venue remains the best alternative naturally limit foreign debtors’ use of U.S. courts in the name of comity but allow the U.S.
magnet districts to maintain their reputation, especially when
facing increasing competition from the U.K. and Singapore.292
292 Graulich, Piraino & Masaro, supra note 27, at 23 (discussing Virgin Atlantic’s recent Chapter 11 filing in the U.K., paired with a Chapter 15 filing in the
Southern District of New York).

